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LIE DETECTOR EVIDENCE-New Mexico Court of
Appeals Holds Voice-Stress Lie Detector Evidence
Conditionally Admissible:
Simon Neustadt Family Center, Inc. v. Bludworth
In Simon Neustadt Family Center, Inc. v. Bludworth, I the New Mexico
Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court may, in its discretion, admit
voice-stress lie detector evidence when the proponent of the evidence
meets certain conditions.2 New Mexico is one of the few states which
has considered the use of this relatively new device, technically known
as the psychological stress evaluator or PSE, and is the only jurisdiction
which expressly has ruled such evidence admissible in the absence of
stipulation.'
The Neustadt decision alone is not likely to have dramatic, far-reaching
effects. Decisions in the area of innovative scientific evidence are notable,
however, as courts increasingly consider the admissibility of evidence
produced by modem scientific devices. The court of appeals in Neustadt
somewhat predictably analyzed the question along the lines of earlier
New Mexico decisions which considered the admissibility of polygraph
evidence. 4 This Note analyzes the Neustadt opinion in light of the New
Mexico polygraph cases and cases that have considered the use of voice-
stress lie detectors.
VOICE-STRESS ANALYSIS
PSE is a device which purportedly allows a trained operator to detect
deception from inaudible changes in the testing subject's voice. 5 Like the
polygraph, the older type of deception-detecting device, the PSE operates
1. 97 N.M. 500, 641 P.2d 531 (Ct. App. 1982).
2. Id. at 506, 641 P.2d at 537. The evidence may be admitted when the proponent of the evidence
has established the qualifications of the examiner, reliability of the test in general, and validity of
the particular test.
3. Trial courts in several jurisdictions have admitted PSE evidence upon stipulation in criminal
trials in which the state was willing to rely on the device. See Note, The Psychological Stress
Evaluator: Yesterday's Dream-Tomorrow's Nightmare, 24 Clev. St. L. Rev. 299, 319 (1975). Two
cases cited in Neustadt as having rejected PSE evidence are more typical of the way courts handle
the evidence. In both Smith v. State, 31 Md. App. 106, 355 A.2d 527 (1976), and State v. Schouest,
351 So. 2d 462 (La. 1977), the courts rejected the PSE evidence primarily on the basis that polygraph
evidence had been rejected in their jurisdictions and the PSE is simply another type of lie detector.
4. See, e.g., State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975); State v. Brionez, 91 N.M.
290, 573 P.2d 224 (Ct. App. 1977); State v. Alderete, 86 N.M. 176, 521 P.2d 138 (Ct. App. 1974).
5. Kenety, The Psychological Stress Evaluator: The Theory, Validity, and Legal Status of an
Innovative "Lie Detector," 55 Ind. L.J. 349 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Kenety]. The court of
appeals relied on this article for information about the operation of the PSE. 97 N.M. at 503, 641
P.2d at 534.
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on the premise that a person experiences stress when lying and as a result
undergoes measurable physiological changes. 6 To detect stress, the po-
lygraph measures changes in blood pressure, pulse, respiration, and elec-
trodermal response.7 A person taking a polygraph test must, therefore,
be attached to a variety of sensors. In contrast, a PSE test can be ad-
ministered without the subject's knowledge, and under normal testing
circumstances requires no elaborate machinery in the testing area. 8 Only
a tape recorder is needed to administer a PSE test; the examiner performs
the actual evaluation later by playing the tape while it is attached to the
PSE. Neither the polygraph nor the PSE detects deception per se, but
only stress. 9 Therefore, the less formal atmosphere of the PSE test is less
likely to induce stress and offers an attractive benefit in that any stress
indicated is "more likely to be the result of deception rather than a reaction
to the equipment." 10
The underlying theory of the PSE is that the human voice has two
components: an audible amplitude modulation (AM) component and an
inaudible frequency modulation (FM) component. Under stress, the FM
component diminishes or disappears. The PSE measures the decrease in
the FM component and thus detects stress. The operator's job, as with
the polygraph, is to interpret the information given by the PSE."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Simon Neustadt Family Center, Inc., and its insurance company, Com-
mercial Union Assurance Companies, Inc., sued Mark Bludworth, Neus-
tadt's employee, for conversion. Commercial Union insured Simon Neustadt
against employee theft 2 and had paid the full policy amount for the loss
allegedly caused by Bludworth's conversion. 3 The trial court ruled against
Bludworth and he appealed the court's refusal to admit evidence of a
psychological stress evaluator test he had taken at Neustadt's request. 1
4
6. Kenety, supra note 5, at 350.
7. Id. at 351 n. 15. Electrodermal response is the electrical conductivity of the skin; the response
varies as the amount of perspiration varies.
8. Id. at 356.
9. Id. at 350.
10. Id. at 356.
11. Id. at 353-55.
12. The complaint alleged that Bludworth converted $44,403.00 in cash from a cash register.
Record on Appeal at 1, Simon Neustadt [hereinafter cited as Record]. The jury returned a verdict
for Neustadt for the full amount. Record at 146. The insurance policy issued by Commercial Union
covered Neustadt for employee theft up to $25,000. 97 N.M. at 502, 641 P.2d at 533. One can see
why both Neustadt and Commercial Union felt the suit would be a worthwhile effort. [The Record
on Appeal, which does not include the briefs, is available at the University of New Mexico Law
Library.]
13. 97 N.M. at 502, 641 P.2d at 533.
14. Bludworth also raised issues of failure to join an indispensible party (Supermarkets of New
Mexico, Neustadt's parent company), failure to admit business records containing PSE evidence,
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Bludworth had sought to have the PSE test admitted to prove his
innocence.' 5 Simon Neustadt's president had asked Bludworth to take the
test because Bludworth worked in the area of the store where "substantial
sums of money had been withdrawn from the cash register .... "16 The
PSE operator, Mr. Sinowitz, told the company president that he "felt that
Mr. Bludworth had truthfully answered all the questions in denying in-
volvement in any of the misappropriated funds. 1 7
The trial court had refused to admit the PSE evidence on three grounds:
(1) an expert did not present the results; (2) psychological stress analysis
is not recognized as a true science in New Mexico; and (3) prejudice
from introducing the PSE evidence would outweigh its probative value.' 8
The court of appeals held that the trial court correctly refused to allow
the PSE evidence under the circumstances and then stated that it would
discuss the issue of PSE evidence "[b]ecause of the importance of the
"119issue and the fact that the question is likely to arise again ... .
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
Bludworth argued on appeal that the court should allow the PSE evi-
dence because the outcome of the case turned on his denial of involvement
in the conversion." He noted that New Mexico courts "have been na-
tionwide leaders in the admission of polygraph tests. 2' His major sub-
stantive argument was that the test for admissibility of such scientific
error in directing a verdict on his counterclaim, and improper jury instructions. Id. The court of
appeals found that Neustadt and its parent company acted as a single entity and that their interest
was identical. Id. The court also noted that there was no "evidence or reasonable possibility that
the defendant will be subject to future claims by Supermarkets," and that Bludworth did not show
he was harmed in any way by the absence of the parent company. Id. at 502-503, 641 P.2d at 533-
34. The court addressed briefly the claim of failure to admit the business records containing PSE
results by noting that the "prejudice which would have resulted from the admission of the business
records containing the PSE results outweighed any probative value." Id. at 506, 641 P.2d at 537.
Bludworth had counterclaimed for pension plan contributions he had made. Id. Prior to trial,
Neustadt had paid Bludworth the full amount of his contributions. Id. On appeal, Bludworth argued
that the issue of punitive damages (Bludworth sought such damages because Neustadt withheld the
payments pending trial) should have gone to the jury. The court of appeals stated that this claim
had "no basis in fact or law." Id. at 507, 641 P.2d at 538.
On the issue of improper jury instructions, the court found that "the instructions read as a whole
fairly presented the issues and applicable law. Defendant was not prejudiced in any way and his
claims are unfounded." Id.
15. Record at 432-37.
16. Brief for Appellant at 1, Simon Neustadt.
17. Id.
18. 97 N.M. at 503, 641 P.2d at 534. Reason (3) can be only dictum because reasons (1) and
(2) mean that the evidence is not relevant; however, this dictum raises the interesting question of
whether evidence prejudicial to the prosecution in a criminal case should be excluded under N.M.
R. Evid. 403.
19. 97 N.M. at 503, 641 P.2d at 534.
20. Brief for Appellant at 7-8.
21. Id. at 8.
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evidence should no longer be one of general scientific acceptance, but
rather, one of "relevancy based upon the reliability of the test in ques-
tion." 22 Without citing authority, Bludworth's brief stated "[tihere is
evidence that PSE tests are reliable." 23 Bludworth's argument concluded
with the idea that because Neustadt had originally requested the test, it
must have had faith in its validity, and therefore should not be allowed
to argue that the operator lacked expertise after unfavorable results had
been obtained .24
Neustadt's arguments on appeal against admission of the PSE evidence
centered on the district court's finding that the PSE operator was "not
an expert in this particular field." ' 2 Counsel noted that the "expert"
offering the evidence had three weeks of instruction in the operation of
the PSE, had trained under another operator for six months, and had been
operating the device for four years. 26 The PSE expert, Mr. Sinowitz,
testified that he had no training in psychology and was not qualified to
determine if a person was "psychologically fit to take the test. .... "27
As an additional point, the appellees also noted that "[t]here was no
evidence that the test has a 'reasonable measure of precision in its in-
dications' as reuqired [sic] by the Alderete case." 28
The court of appeals began its analysis of the issue with a brief ex-
position on the operation of the PSE.29 The court stressed the importance
of a properly trained examiner to interpret the results of a PSE test. It
then stated that when a party seeks to introduce PSE evidence, a court
must apply the three-prong test for admissibility of polygraph evidence
set forth in State v. Dorsey.3" Dorsey is a 1975 New Mexico Supreme
Court case which held polygraph evidence admissible without stipulation.
It is the New Mexico authority on admission of polygraph evidence. 3'
The Dorsey test, as stated by the Neustadt court, allows admission of
polygraph results "when evidence is introduced concerning: (1) qualifi-
cations and expertise of the polygraph operator; (2) reliability of the testing
22. Id. at 9. For this proposition the brief cited Romero, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence
Under the New Mexico and Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 N.M.L. Rev. 187 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Romero].
23. Brief for Appellant at 9.
24. Id. at 9-10.
25. Brief for Appellees at 5, Simon Neustadt.
26. Record at 423.
27. Id. at 425.
28. Id. State v. Alderete, 86 N.M. 176, 521 P.2d 138 (Ct. App. 1974), is the New Mexico Court
of Appeals case holding polygraph evidence admissible without stipulation. See infra text accom-
panying note 53.
29. The court's authority for the operation of the PSE was Kenety, supra note 5. 97 N.M. at
503, 641 P.2d at 534.
30. 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975).
31. See Romero, supra note 22. Professor Romero's article discussed State v. Dorsey at length.
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procedure employed as approved by authorities in the field; and (3) the
validity of the test made on the subject." 32
The first prong of the Dorsey test disposed of the issue in Neustadt.
The evaluator who performed the test "was not a licensed polygrapher,
had no training in psychology or medicine, and testified he could not
determine if a person was psychologically fit to take the test." 33 Because
the expertise of the examiner is a critical factor in lie detection,34 the
appellate court upheld the trial court's refusal to accept the PSE operator
as an expert. 35
The court relied on State v. Alderete36 for the preferred qualifications
of a polygraph examiner. These criteria require that the examiner have a
college degree,37 at least six months training under an experienced ex-
aminer providing opportunity for frequent supervised testing, five years
experience as a specialist in the field of polygraph examinations, and that
the examiner's testimony be based upon records he produces in court and
which are available for purposes of cross examination.3" Although the
Alderete court stated that "[t]hese standards have been accepted in the
courts," 39 the Neustadt court only noted that "[a]lthough these qualifi-
cations are not legal requirements .. . they may be helpful to a trial
court. "I
The Neustadt court discussed reliability of PSE, the most important
issue in determining its admissibility, in its application of the second
prong of the Dorsey test. To evaluate the reliability of the PSE, the court
looked to the rule for admissibility of scientific evidence found in Frye
v. United States.41 In the words of the New Mexico Court of Appeals,
32. 97 N.M. at 504, 641 P.2d at 535.
33. Id.
34. Kenety, supra note 5, at 355-56. The examiner's expertise is a critical factor because the
PSE, like the polygraph, does not actually detect "lies," it only detects stress. The examiner interprets
the stress indications and determines whether the subject is lying.
35. 97 N.M. at 504, 641 P.2d at 535.
36. 86 N.M. 176, 521 P.2d 138 (Ct. App. 1974). The Alderete court relied on J. Reid & F.
Inbau, Truth and Deception 235 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Reid & Inbaul, for these criteria.
37. Neither the Alderete court nor Reid & Inbau, supra note 36, state that the college degree
should be in any particular area. Reid & Inbau suggest only that the college degree is an indication
that the examiner is an intelligent person. Reid & Inbau, supra note 36, at 235.
38. 86 N.M. at 177, 521 P.2d at 139.
39. Id.
40. 97 N.M. at 504, 641 P.2d at 535.
41. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye court considered the admissibility of results from
the systolic blood pressure deception test. The "Frye test" has been applied to determine admissibility
of various types of evidence. See State v. Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 622 P.2d 986 (1981) (blood
analysis in murder case held admissible); State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508, 443 A.2d 1020 (1982)
(psychiatric testimony as to character traits common to rapists held inadmissible); State v. Beachum,
97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. quashed, 98 N.M. 51, 644 P.2d 1040 (1982)
(hypnotic evidence held admissible). State v. Washington, 229 Kan. at-, 622 P.2d at 991, contains
an extensive list of types of evidence to which courts have applied the Frye test.
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"Frye held that for expert testimony concerning scientific evidence to be
admissible the scientific technique must have gained general acceptance
in the particular field in which it belongs. At some point, a new scientific
technique becomes reliable enough to be used in court." 42 The Neustadt
court emphasized that reliability is the most important consideration in
deciding whether to admit PSE evidence.
43
After noting that there is a diversity of opinion on the reliability of
PSE, the court cited two studies which obtained very favorable results
with the PSE. 4 The court did not follow cases from Maryland and Lou-
isiana rejecting use of the PSE "because both Maryland and Louisiana
reject polygraph evidence." 45 The court concluded, with seemingly little
support for the reliability and validity of PSE testing, that "a rule of per
se inadmissibility is unnecessarily broad and may result in the exclusion
of evidence that may be valuable and accurate." 46
Turning to the third prong of the Dorsey test, the court stated that if
the first two elements of the test are met, evidence must be introduced
establishing that the test performed on a particular person is valid.47 This
foundation evidence includes testimony about the condition of the PSE
equipment, proper use of procedures,48 and the subject's psychological
state at the time of testing.49
The Neustadt court stated that if the proponent of the PSE evidence
has met the three prongs of the Dorsey test and the court has admitted
the PSE evidence, then the court should give Uniform Jury Instruction
2.13.10 This instruction relates to the weight the jury is to give to expert
testimony and allows the jury to reject the expert opinion if it concludes
the opinion is unsound.5
42. 97 N.M. at 504, 641 P.2d at 535.
43. Id. at 505, 641 P.2d at 536.
44. The two studies are M. Kradz, The Psychological Stress Evaluator: A Study (1972), reprinted
in Hearings on the Use of Polygraphs and Similar Devices by Federal Agencies Before Subcommittee
on Foreign Operations and Government Information of the House Committee on Government Op-
erations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15, 225, 228, 435-436 (1974), and J. Worth & B. Lewis, An
Early Validation Study with the Psychological Stress Evaluator (PSE) (1972).
45. 97 N.M. at 505, 641 P.2d at 536. The cases are Smith v. State, 31 Md. App. 106, 355 A.2d
527 (1976) (the New Mexico Reports and Pacific Reporter Second publications of Neustadt incorrectly
cite this case at 335 A.2d), and State v. Schouest, 351 So. 2d 462 (La. 1977). Both Smith and
Schouest rejected PSE evidence simply because their courts do not admit polygraph evidence. The
Smith court stated: "A lie detector test by any other name is still a lie detector test." 31 Md. App.
at , 355 A.2d at 536.
46. 97 N.M. at 505, 641 P.2d at 536.
47. Id. at 506, 641 P.2d at 537.
48. Because the PSE does not detect deception per se, but rather stress, a pretest interview is
essential to determine if the subject may be experiencing stress from other factors. See Kenety,
supra note 5, at 372, for more details of the operation of PSE.
49. 97 N.M. at 506, 641 P.2d at 537.
50. Id.
51. N.M. U.J.I. Civ. 2.13 (Expert Testimony) provides in full:
The rules of evidence do not ordinarily permit a witness to testify as to an opinion
or conclusion. An expert witness is an exception to this rule. A witness who, by
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THE DORSEY TEST
The Dorsey test is a product of judicial development in New Mexico.
This development began in 1961 with State v. Trimble, 2 a case in which
the New Mexico Supreme Court held it error to admit results of a po-
lygraph test over an objection. The next step in the development of the
Dorsey test came in State v. Alderete,53 in which the court of appeals
stated that "[s]cientific recognition of polygraphic tests has now arrived,"
and held that a court may admit polygraph test results when the proponent
lays a proper foundation.54 The Alderete court stated that the required
foundational elements were as follows: "The polygraphist must be qual-
ified as an examiner. The proposed test must be accepted in his profession.
The proposed test must show that it has a reasonable measure of precision
in its indications." 55 These foundation requirements contain the essential
elements of the Dorsey test.
The New Mexico Supreme Court partially overruled Alderete in State
v. Lucero.56 Lucero required five elements for admission of polygraph
evidence: (1) Both parties must stipulate to the test, (2) there must be no
objections at trial, (3) the polygraph operator's qualifications and expertise
must be established, (4) the reliability of the testing procedure must be
established, and (5) the validity of the test on the particular subject must
be established. 57 The last three requirements are similar to the three
requirements imposed in Alderete. The Lucero court did not provide an
express rationale for the five requirements, but the opinion did cite four
New Mexico cases and a Tenth Circuit opinion as supporting these re-
quirements58
A short time after the Lucero decision, the court of appeals decided
Dorsey and eliminated the first two elements of the Lucero test.59 On
certiorari, the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld the court of appeals
decision in Dorsey6° on the grounds that the first two requirements, stip-
education and experience, has become expert in any art, science, profession or
calling may be permitted to state an opinion as to a matter in which the witness
is versed and which is material to the case. An expert may also state the reasons
for such opinion.
You should consider each expert opinion received in evidence in this case and
give it such weight as you think it deserves. You may reject it entirely if you
consider the opinion is unsound.
52. 68 N.M. 406, 362 P.2d 788 (1961).
53. 86 N.M. 176, 521 P.2d 138 (Ct. App. 1974).
54. Id. at 178, 521 P.2d at 140.
55. Id.
56. 86 N.M. 686, 526 P.2d 1091 (1974).
57. Id. at 688, 526 P.2d at 1093.
58. Id. The court cited Chavez v. State, 456 F.2d 1072 (10th Cir. 1972); State v. Trimble, 68
N.M. 406, 362 P.2d 788 (1961); State v. Varos, 69 N.M. 19, 363 P.2d 629 (1961); State v. Chavez,
82 N.M. 238, 478 P.2d 566 (Ct. App. 1970); and State v. Chavez, 80 N.M. 786, 461 P.2d 919
(Ct. App. 1969).
59. 87 N.M. 323, 532 P.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1975).
60. 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975).
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ulation and lack of objection, were: "(1) mechanistic in nature; (2)
[i]nconsistent with the concept of due process;" and "[r]epugnant to the
announced purpose and construction6 of the New Mexico Rules of Evi-
dence." 6 2 Thus, the Dorsey test came to be the standard for the admis-
sibility of polygraph evidence.
ANALYSIS OF DECISION
In Neustadt, the "expert's" lack of qualifications was sufficient reason
to affirm the trial court's refusal to admit the PSE evidence. The New
Mexico Court of Appeals, however, chose to go beyond the situation
before it and address the PSE issue at large.
The Dorsey test is an appropriate means of determining whether lie
detector or other scientific evidence should be admitted. The court should
always consider the qualifications of an expert witness63 and the validity
of a particular scientific test. The second prong of the Dorsey test is the
key issue, however, and the New Mexico Court of Appeals may not have
made sufficient inquiry into the reliability of the PSE. The two cases cited
as rejecting PSE did so only on the basis of rejecting all lie detector tests;
the court of appeals therefore properly distinguished those decisions.
The court cited Frye for the proposition that "to be admissible the
scientific technique must have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs. "I This requirement creates the weak point in
the Neustadt opinion because there is no consensus that the PSE has
gained general acceptance in the field of deception detection. The only
cases cited in Neustadt as addressing the issue of reliability held PSE
evidence inadmissible. A law review article,65 cited in Neustadt for its
discussion of the operation of the PSE, also states:
There have been no controlled scientific field studies of the PSE
conducted by a disinterested party. The results of laboratory simu-
lations have been inconclusive and conflicting, and although field
results and manufacturers' studies have indicated that the PSE may
have considerable utility, as yet they have not been validated by
independent research. . . . [Tihe extent of its validity remains un-
determined.'
61. The court quoted the "announced purpose and construction" from the New Mexico Rules of
Evidence (then N.M. Stat. Ann. §§20-4-101 to -1102 (1953 Repl. Vol. 4, Supp. 1975, Interim
Supp. 1976, & Interim Supp. 1976-77)): "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration . . .and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end
that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-102
(1953 Repl. Vol. 4, Supp. 1975). This statement is now at N.M. R. Evid. 102.
62. 88 N.M. at 185, 539 P.2d at 205 (1975).
63. N.M. R. Evid. 702 requires that a witness be "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training or education."
64. 97 N.M. at 504, 641 P.2d at 535.
65. See Kenety, supra note 5.
66. Id. at 357.
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The court cited this article for details of how the PSE operates, but ap-
parently overlooked the author's suggestion that the device may not pro-
duce reliable results.
In addition to the questions about the reliability of PSE, there is evi-
dence that this technique has not gained general acceptance in decisions
refusing to license PSE operators. In Heisse v. Vermont,67 a PSE operator
challenged the constitutionality of a Vermont statute68 that restricted li-
censing of "deception detectors" to users of polygraph devices. The
United States District Court for Vermont upheld the statute, noting that
"there is disagreement in the scientific community about the validity of
PSE testing. ",69 Another decision rejecting licensing of PSE operators,
Illinois Polygraph Society v. Pellicano,7° upheld a statute7 requiring "de-
tection-of-deception" examiners to use polygraph-type equipment. The
Pellicano court found that the statute required that "cardiovascular and
respiratory-pattern recordings must be used in any analysis of a detection-
of-deception examination."72
The fundamental question to be answered about any evidence is whether
it is relevant:73 does the evidence tend "to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 74 This question
of relevancy, the Neustadt court correctly noted, is "inextricably linked"
to a scientific technique's reliability: "once the technique is shown to be
reliable it is relevant to prove what it purports to prove." 7" The Neustadt
court's use of the Frye test implies that the reliability of a technique is
to be shown by general scientific acceptance.76 Although a device or
technique would probably not be generally accepted if it were not reliable,
it is possible that a new technique could be shown to be reliable before
it has gained general scientific acceptance. This situation is especially
likely to arise in today's environment of rapid scientific advancements.
The Frye test has been criticized for lacking guidelines for its appli-
67. 519 F. Supp. 36 (D.Vt. 1980).
68. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, § 2903 (Supp. 1982). New Mexico has a similar statute which provides
that: "It is unlawful for any person to practice polygraphy, for any consideration, without a license
issued by the attorney general in accQrdance with the Polygraphy Act." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 61-26-
4 (Repl. Pamp. 1979).
69. 519 E Supp. at 41.
70. 83 111. 2d 130, 414 N.E.2d 458 (1980).
71. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111, § 2403 (Supp. 1982-83).
72. 83 I11. 2d at __, 414 N.E.2d at 462.
73. N.M. R. Evid. 402 provides that: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by constitution, by statute, by these rules or by other rules adopted by the supreme court.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." (Emphasis added.)
74. N.M. R. Evid. 401.
75. 97 N.M. at 504, 641 P.2d at 535.
76. "Frye held that for expert testimony ... to be admissible the scientific technique must have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. At some point, a new scientific
technique becomes reliable enough to be used in court." Id.
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cation and for rejecting potentially valuable evidence.77 A test of reli-
ability, on the other hand, would allow unique forms of evidence which
have not gained general acceptance to be admitted, if the evidence was
shown to be reliable.78 A proponent could show reliability by a controlled
scientific experiment. The adoption of a reliability test would have been
appropriate with a relatively new technique such as the PSE. But even
if, as suggested in Bludworth's brief, the Neustadt court had used a test
of reliability rather than one of general scientific acceptance, the court
would have been hard pressed to find substantial evidence of the PSE's
reliability. At least one court79 has gone so far as to state that "all au-
thorities agree [PSE] is unreliable .... "10
Because juries may be awed by "scientific evidence" and may tend to
give too much credence to evidence offered by "experts," 8 courts should
be wary of allowing the introduction of such evidence. A conservative
attitude is especially appropriate where, as in the case of the PSE, there
is much controversy about the reliability of the evidence. The directive
given by Uniform Jury Instruction 2.13, that the jury may reject scientific
evidence if it thinks the evidence unsound, may not be sufficient to
overcome the effect of a jury's fascination with a "miracle" that appears
to allow an examiner to detect lies merely from a person's voice.
CONCLUSION
If the PSE does prove to be a reliable tool, the New Mexico courts
will be far ahead of other jurisdictions in the use of PSE, as they are
now with the use of polygraph evidence.82 The Neustadt court clearly
indicated that PSE results would be admissible under the right circum-
stances, even though the requirements were not met in the case before
the court. Perhaps the most powerful support for the Neustadt court's
decision to allow use of PSE evidence is found in its quotation of Rule
102 of the New Mexico Rules of Evidence: "These rules . . .shall be
construed to secure fairness in administration .. . and promotion of
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth
may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." 83 This policy,
combined with Rule 403 (the trial judge has discretion in determining
whether to allow the evidence),84 and Jury Instruction 2.13 (the jury may
77. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 22, at 189-92.
78. Romero, supra note 22, at 206.
79. People v. Vinson, 104 Misc. 2d 664, 428 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
80. Id. at __, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
81. See Romero, supra note 22, at 208.
82. New Mexico is the only state which allows polygraph evidence in the absence of stipulation.
Kenety, supra note 5, at 353.
83. 97 N.M. at 505, 641 P.2d at 536 (quoting N.M. R. Evid. 102).
84. N.M. R. Evid. 403 allows the judge to exclude evidence if it is overly prejudicial, confusing,
misleading, cumulative, or a waste of time.
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reject expert scientific evidence), may be sufficient to temper the effects
of allowing the admission of such evidence. But the evidence is relevant
only if it is reliable. Therefore, a court should not admit PSE evidence
until it is determined to be reliable.
DONALD R. FENSTERMACHER
